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Abstract—A number of vehicular networking applications require
continuous knowledge of the location of vehicles and tracking of the
routes they follow, including, e.g., real-time traffic monitoring, e-tolling,
and liability attribution in case of accidents. Locating and tracking
vehicles has however strong implications in terms of security and user
privacy. On the one hand, there should be a mean for an authority
to verify the correctness of positioning information announced by a
vehicle, so as to identify potentially misbehaving cars. On the other,
public disclosure of identity and position of drivers should be avoided,
so as not to jeopardize user privacy. In this paper, we address such is-
sues by introducing A-VIP, a secure, privacy-preserving framework for
continuous tracking of vehicles. A-VIP leverages anonymous position
beacons from vehicles, and the cooperation of nearby cars collecting
and reporting the beacons they hear. Such information allows a
location authority to verify the positions announced by vehicles, or
to infer the actual ones if needed, without resorting to computationally
expensive asymmetric cryptography. We assess the effectiveness of
A-VIP via realistic simulation and experimental testbeds.
Index Terms—Vehicular networks, position verification, privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Borrowing from a well-established communication pattern
in wireless LANs, vehicular networks have adopted the term
beaconing to indicate the periodic broadcasting of messages
to neighboring vehicles or road-side units (RSUs). These
messages, defined, e.g., in the SAE J2735 specifications,
can be used for safety purposes as well as for coopera-
tive awareness. The information they carry (e.g., vehicle
ID, timestamps and location information) may be secured
through the use of an on-board tamper-proof Hardware
Security Module (HSM) as well as signatures, cryptography
and certificates [1].
Secure beacons for vehicle position identification and
tracking are needed in a number of scenarios where vehicle
position accountability is a requirement in order to provide
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services to the community or to drivers. Secure reporting of
vehicle location can substantiate drivers’ claims in case of
accidents. At the same time, secure location verification by
authorities can provide accountability for those involved.
However, ensuring secure positioning must cope with
three major problems, concerning (i) users’ privacy, (ii)
computational costs of security and (iii) the system trust on
user correctness. As for the first aspect, when not strictly
required, public disclosure of the vehicle identity to all
receiving devices in the proximity of a beaconer is an issue.
Vehicles can be tracked, jeopardizing drivers’ privacy and
requiring complex pseudonym management [2]. Thus, there
is a need for separating secure position identification by
authorities and the possibility of undesirable user tracking
by peers in the vehicular network. As for the second aspect,
standard security mechanisms based on, e.g., asymmetric
cryptography, induce significant protocol overhead and com-
putational complexity. In fact, their use is recommended to
be largely dependent on the applications and circumstances,
and avoided whenever possible [3]. Finally, basic solutions
cannot guarantee the correctness of the location information
provided by a user who owns the required cryptographic
material, but has a malfunctioning GPS receiver or can
tamper with GPS data before they are input to the HSM.
In this paper, we address the issues above by proposing
A-VIP (Anonymous Verification and Inference of Positions),
a framework that, unlike previous work:
(i) allows a trusted authority to securely collect and
verify the positions claimed by vehicles without resorting
to computationally expensive asymmetric cryptography – as
is instead done in the IEEE 1609.2 standard [4];
(ii) in presence of unverified location claims, grants the
authority the capability to infer the actual position of mal-
functioning or misbehaving vehicles;
(iii) does so by safeguarding drivers’ privacy with respect
to other vehicles participating in the network, and without
any requirement for uninterrupted radio coverage from road-
side infrastructure.
2To achieve such goals, A-VIP leverages anonymous posi-
tion beacons from vehicles, which prevent overhearing nodes
from identifying or tracking their source, but still allow
authorized third parties – sharing secret information with
the beaconing vehicles – to perform such operations. Then,
an authenticated reciprocal beacon reporting scheme grants
an authority the possibility to verify the locations claimed by
vehicles and infer unverified positions by efficiently solving
an optimization problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After
reviewing related work in Sec. 2, we describe the system
scenario and communication protocol in Sec. 3. Sec. 4
details the location verification and inference procedures,
while Sec. 5 discusses the resilience of A-VIP to attacks
by adversarial vehicles. The performance of A-VIP in both
simulated and real-road environments is shown in Sec. 6.
Finally, Sec. 7 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
When considering the problem of location verification and
inference, an extensive literature can be found in the domain
of wireless sensor networks, including among others [5]–
[8]. However, it is commonly acknowledged that solutions
designed for static nodes do not fit the highly mobile
vehicular scenarios we target.
Specific to the vehicular environment, many works have
focused on pure ad-hoc vehicular network environments
where no infrastructure or central authorities are considered.
There, the aim is the verification of reciprocal position
information so as to secure cooperative awareness and mul-
tihop routing. To that end, a number of different solutions
have been proposed that leverage diverse metrics, including
the distance among nodes and their relative mobility [9],
[10], the Time-of-Flight (ToF) distance bounding [11] and
ranging [12], the Received Signal Strength (RSS) within a
two-hop neighborhood [13], or the presence of Non Line-of-
sight (NLOS) conditions [14]. There have also been propos-
als to use dedicated hardware, such as multiple directional
antennas [15], or original data structures, such as trusted
routing tables [16].
With A-VIP, we take a different approach, considering the
problem of vehicle position verification from the viewpoint
of a trusted authority that collects car-generated location
information through a roadside or cellular infrastructure.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt at
designing a position verification system that considers such
a perspective – which, although less visionary than the ad-
hoc one, is more consistent with that expected to be the most
viable architecture for secure vehicular communication sys-
tems [17]. Thus, our optimization problem formulation and
the resulting centralized solution are hardly comparable with
the techniques presented in the papers mentioned before.
We also remark that A-VIP does not only allow for posi-
tion verification, but also addresses the problem of inferring
the location of untrusted cars, and does so by granting user
anonymity. Solutions have been proposed that specifically
tackle the latter problems individually, such as [18], [19], but
ours is the first work to present a comprehensive framework
for secure, privacy-preserving localization.
Finally, our work is the first to experimentally evaluate the
performance of a position verification and inference system
through real-world testbeds.
3 ANONYMOUS POSITIONING PROCEDURE
We consider a WAVE-based vehicular network composed of
vehicles communicating with each other and, occasionally,
with RSUs. No assumption is made on the deployment of
RSUs, so vehicles may travel along road segments where no
RSU coverage is available. Vehicles may have also a 3G/LTE
radio interface, through which they can access the cellular
network that fully covers the road topology. Both RSUs and
cellular base stations allow vehicles to contact a Location
Authority (LA), which is in charge of collecting location
claims, verifying them and inferring the actual positions of
vehicles deemed to announce incorrect locations.
Vehicles are equipped with GPS, thus, unless otherwise
specified, they know their own position and share a common
time reference. Each vehicle owns cryptographic material,
i.e., a certified identity and a long-term secret key, used to
establish a secure channel with the LA at any time, through
either an RSU or the cellular infrastructure. Solutions already
exist for the distribution and management of long-term
pairwise keys in vehicular environments (see, e.g., [4], [17]),
and their discussion is out of the scope of this paper.
Vehicles that comply with the A-VIP mechanism are
defined as correct, while the others may be: (i) faulty, that
is, they follow the protocol but provide incorrect information
due to, e.g., GPS malfunctioning, or (ii) adversarial, i.e.,
their aim is to announce a fake position and have it verified,
so as to obtain some advantage, discredit nearby users, or
disrupt the A-VIP operation. To that end, adversarial nodes
can either deviate from the A-VIP communication protocol
procedure, or comply with it but inject false information. In
this work, we consider internal adversaries, more challenging
than external ones, as they own the cryptographic material
to participate in the protocol. We consider however that
adversaries are unable to forge messages on behalf of other
nodes whose keys they do not have. Adversaries may be
further distinguished as independent or colluding: in this
paper we focus on the former. However, in our analysis we
also evaluate Sybil attacks, which can be viewed as a worst
case of an attack carried out by colluding adversaries.
3.1 A-VIP goals
A-VIP aims at verifying the positions announced by correct
vehicles while guaranteeing their privacy with respect to the
other ones, and at detecting faulty or adversarial nodes while
inferring their actual locations. Such goals are to be achieved
with low computational complexity.
We stress that, barring the use of complex pseudonym
management schemes [2], anonymity cannot be imple-
mented simply by letting a vehicle issue beacons where its
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Fig. 1. A-VIP procedures by beaconer, reporter and LA.
identity is encrypted with the long-term shared key it shares
with the LA. Indeed, some form of plaintext ID, attached
to the encrypted beacon, would be needed for the LA to
recognize the beacon originator and choose the appropriate
key to decrypt the remainder of the message. Clearly, the
presence of a plaintext ID would jeopardize the vehicle
privacy, whose protection is one of our goals, allowing for
overhearing and tracking by unauthorized receivers.
Additionally, we cannot just rely on encrypted cellular
upload of the positioning information by vehicles. As a
matter of fact, A-VIP is designed to be compatible with the
cellular access infrastructure, but not to depend on it. More
importantly, as discussed in Sec. 1, direct cellular upload
does not allow for a verification of the location claimed by
vehicles, which is instead part of the goals of A-VIP.
3.2 Communication procedures
The procedures in the A-VIP protocol are described below,
while a schematic overview is shown in Fig. 1.
Registration. The registration procedure takes place every
time a vehicle is started, and is repeated after a registration
validity time has expired. It is performed over the secure
channel between the vehicle and the LA, established with
the long-term key via the RSU infrastructure, if available,
or through 3G/LTE, otherwise.
Let us assume that a generic vehicle vi sends a registration
request at time instant ti,0. The LA records such an instant
and returns to the vehicle a registration triplet (Ki, ri, oi)
where Ki is a short-term 128-bit AES symmetric key, and
ri, oi are random integers. The triplet is used to compute
a time-dependent secret i(t), shared between the vehicle
and the LA. As detailed later, when sent by vi to the LA,
i(t) allows the LA to verify the freshness of a beacon
transmission and the identity of its originator. In order to
compute it, the two entities initialize a counter to ri and
increment it by oi every τb seconds, e.g., at every beacon
transmission. The updated counter is then encrypted with
Ki using AES in counter mode (AES-CTR) [20]. Thus, in
general, if ti,0 + nτb ≤ t < ti,0 + (n + 1)τb, then i(t) =
EKi{ri+noi} =
n
i . Note that both ri and oi can be picked
at random since the chances of collision among n values,
related to different vehicles at the same time, are negligible.
The LA is then in a position to precompute all the
upcoming values of ni for a period that depends on the
registration validity time. Clearly, the amount of memory
needed by the LA to store precomputed values of ni
depends on the average number of vehicles in the area served
by the LA and the time interval for which the ni values are
precomputed. As an example, in the scenario described in
Sec. 6.1 and assuming a validity time equal to 1 hour, the
required storage space at the LA for all vehicles amounts to
an easily accommodated 52 Mbytes of memory.
Anonymous beaconing. When traveling, all correct vehi-
cles broadcast a beacon every τb, as foreseen by current
standards. Beacon messages are broadcast by nature, and
thus they are subject to undetected collisions over the
wireless medium. While this may affect A-VIP operations,
we stress that our approach can easily incorporate solutions
to dynamically reduce channel contention such as [21].
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that all beacon
transmissions occur at a power level common to all correct
vehicles and at the basic data rate. Also, we assume the
beacon to be split into two parts: an encrypted one, for
the purposes set forth in this paper, and an unencrypted
one, where plaintext content can be broadcast for such
purposes as collision avoidance or cooperative awareness.
We assume however that the beacon is anonymous, i.e., it
does not include the vehicle identifier and it uses a fresh
random MAC-layer address [17]. When not transmitting,
the vehicle listens to the channel, overhearing beacons from
other vehicles and collecting the information therein for later
reporting to the LA.
The beacon content is assembled using the triplet assigned
to a vehicle during the registration. Specifically, the n-
th beacon issued by a vehicle vi carries two pieces of
information, as shown in the “Beaconer” box of Fig. 1:
(a) the time-dependent secret ni , which can be computed
by vi and by the LA, independently of each other;
(b) the encrypted current location announced by the
vehicle ni = EKi{( l
n
i || z
n−1
i ) ⊕ (ri + noi)}, computed
using the short-term pairwise key Ki from the triplet. The
plaintext location lni is concatenated with the one-bit flag
zn−1i used to notify the LA whether the beacon issued at
step n− 1 was affected by a replay attack (as explained in
Sec. 5). Such a string is then XOR’ed with the plaintext
counter value (ri + noi), to ensure freshness of the beacon
positioning content and thwart partial-replay attacks (as also
detailed in Sec. 5).
Reporting. When a beacon issued by a vehicle vi is correctly
received by a vehicle vj , the latter is required to store the
following entry in a report table, such as the one depicted
in the “Reporter” box of Fig. 1:
• the time tji at which the beacon is received;
• its own position lji at the time the beacon was received;
• the secret ni carried in the beacon;
• the encrypted position ni of vi carried in the beacon;
4• an optional field Qnji, indicating the received signal
quality (e.g., the received signal power computed by
the radio interface driver).
Every τr seconds (report interval), vj generates a report
message including the report table, populated with data
collected from all newly overheard beacons. The report is
transmitted to the LA, ensuring authentication and integrity
through standard procedures. The transmission may occur
via the RSU or via the cellular network if RSUs are scarce
and real-time positioning is required. Additionally, multihop
vehicle-to-vehicle communication can be exploited to reach
nearby RSUs and, hence, speed up the report delivery.
We remark that vehicles normally act as both beaconers
and reporters, and that the LA needs to receive only report
messages, not the beacons broadcast by vehicles. Also, the
communication procedures outlined above allow for a fully
anonymous information exchange, preventing overhearing
and thus ensuring user privacy.
4 POSITION VERIFICATION AND INFERENCE
When the LA receives reports from vehicles, it processes
them so as to (i) determine the locations announced by cars
in the system, (ii) verify such locations and (iii) infer the
actual positions of vehicles deemed to have advertised an
incorrect location.
Let the LA divide the road topology into discretized
spatial tiles, whose set is denoted by S. Also, let V be the
set of vehicles that the LA has to verify. Upon receiving a
report message from vehicle vj ∈ V , the LA processes one
report table entry at a time, as follows:
• it extracts the time tji at which vj received the beacon;
• for each vk ∈ V , it computes n such that tk,0 + nτb ≤
tji < tk,0+(n+1)τb, i.e., n = ⌊(tji− tk,0)/τb⌋, and it
looks up the precomputed secret value nk that matches
the ni in the report table entry (LA box in Fig. 1).
When a match is found, the LA identifies vi as the vehicle
that sent the beacon and retrieves the triplet associated to
it 1. Then, the LA performs the following actions:
(1) it decrypts the ni field entered by vi in the beacon
reported by vj , extracting the announced position lni and the
flag zn−1i ;
(2) if the zn−1i flag is set, it discards the entry;
(3) otherwise, if zn−1i is unset, it stores n, the position l
n
i
included in the beacon by vi and the position lnj announced
by vj in the report table entry. If present, the LA also stores
the signal quality indicator, Qnji, that vj measured on the
beacon received from vi.
The LA leverages the information extracted from the
report table entry to identify the possible tiles corresponding
to a vehicle position, thus verifying the location claim and
possibly determining the actual vehicle location in case of
mismatch. Clearly, the same beacon, characterized by a
single ni , may be reported by multiple vehicles traveling in
1. If no match for ni is found, the report entry is discarded. This may
happen as a result of, e.g., replay attacks or node malfunctioning.
vi
vj
vk
(a)
vi
vj
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(b)
Fig. 2. Q-unaware approach: vi’s beacon is reported to
the LA by vk and vj . The shaded circle in (a) represents
the transmission range of vi, while the white circles
denote the receiving range of vk and vj . The shaded
area in (b) represents the possible locations resulting
from the combination of the two reports.
the proximity of vi when the latter broadcasted it. If so, the
LA can obtain a better estimation of the beaconer position
by combining the received reports. The steps required by this
operation are detailed in the rest of this section, where, for
sake of clarity, we drop the time notation and assume that
all measures refer to the same beacon broadcast interval n.
4.1 Cooperative position identification
Depending on whether the quality indicator Qji is included
in the report or not, the LA can adopt two different ap-
proaches to identify the tiles corresponding to the position
of the beaconer vi. The two techniques, named Q-unaware
and Q-aware, operate as follows.
The Q-unaware approach. In this case, the LA does
not have any information on the quality level with which
the beacon signal was received at the reporter. Thus, for
each pair of tiles (s, t) ∈ S2, it can assume a simple 0-1
propagation model to state whether a beacon sent from tile
s can be heard in t or not, i.e., h(s, t) : S2 → {0, 1}. We
remark that any methodology could be used to determine
the vehicle radio range: from a simple unit disc model,
displayed in Fig. 2, to a signal map drawn from real-world
measurements [22].
Given that vj located in tile t ∈ S received the beacon
from vi, then the LA can identify a set of tiles, S
(j)
i ⊆ S,
where the beaconer could have been. Due to the simple
propagation model, all tiles in S(j)i correspond to the right
location with equal probability. Thus, the probability that the
beaconer was in tile s when vj heard its beacon is given by:
p(j)i,s =
{
1
|S(j)i |
if s ∈ S(j)i
0 otherwise .
(1)
Note that, if multiple reports from correct nodes are
available, the corresponding sets of tiles may intersect, as
depicted in Fig. 2(b). In this case, the LA can obtain a better
estimate of the true position of vi. Considering the intersec-
tion translates into computing the following probability:
P (Ri)i,s =
∏
j:vj∈Ri
p(j)i,s∑
u∈S
∏
j:vj∈Ri
p(j)i,u
∀s ∈ S , (2)
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Fig. 3. Q-aware approach: the beacon from vi is re-
ported by vk and vj . The shaded area in (a) represents
the transmission range of vi. The annuluses denote the
set of locations from which a beacon could be received
by, respectively, vk and vj with the quality level indicated
in their report. In (b), the intersection of the annuluses
represents the possible positions of vi.
where Ri is the set of vehicles that reported vi’s beacon.
We stress that p(j)i,s represents the probability that vi was
in s while sending the beacon, computed taking only one
report into account. P (Ri)i,s represents the same probability,
yet computed by combining the information received from
multiple correct reporters.
The Q-aware approach. When a report includes the Qji
value related to a beacon reception, such information can be
exploited to refine the position estimate of beaconer vi. To
do so, the LA needs an accurate model of the propagation
conditions in the area where the broadcast transmission took
place, including received signal quality information. Again,
deterministic (e.g., ray-tracing), stochastic, or measurement-
based models can be used: the Q-aware procedure does not
change and is performed as follows.
Let the propagation model be a function h(s, t, Qji) :
S2×R→ [0, 1] that, for any pair of tiles (s, t) and any signal
quality value Qji, provides the probability P(R
(j)
t |B
(i)
s , Qji)
that a beacon sent by vi from tile s can be received by
vj ∈ Ri in tile t, with the quality level Qji reported by vj .
By applying Bayes’ theorem, the LA can use such values
to compute the probability P(B(i)s |R
(j)
t , Qji) that the bea-
coner was in title s, given that the beacon was heard by vj
in tile t, with a quality level Qji. Specifically,
p(j)i,s = P(B
(i)
s |R
(j)
t , Qji) =
=
P(R(j)t |B
(i)
s , Qji) · P(B
(i)
s )∑
u∈S P(R
(j)
t |B
(i)
u , Qji) · P(B
(i)
u )
(3)
where P(B(i)x ), x = s, u, is the probability that the broad-
casting vehicle vi is in tile x at the time of transmission. This
value may depend on the vehicle density and on the size of
the considered area. We assume however a generic scenario
where no such knowledge is available, and the probability
is equally spread among all tiles, i.e., P(B(i)s ) = 1/|S| for
any vi and any tile in s ∈ S.
Upon receiving multiple reports, the LA can again resort
to (2) to combine the Q-aware probabilities computed as in
(3). Then, it can determine the tiles the beaconer could have
been at the moment of the broadcast, with the associated
probabilities P (Ri)i,s . Note that, unlike the Q-unaware case,
such probabilities are now Q-dependent and provide better
location estimates, assuming that the underlying signal qual-
ity model is accurate enough.
A simple example of the Q-aware approach is portrayed
in Fig. 3, where two reporters, vk and vj , include different
quality levels for a beacon received from vi. For simplicity,
in the figure we considered that the area corresponding to
the value of Q, indicated by a reporter, maps onto an annulus
comprised in its reception range. Then, the set of possible
locations of the beaconer is given by the intersection of the
two annuluses, i.e., the shaded area in Fig. 3(b).
4.2 Assessing the trustworthiness of vehicles
The technique used in the previous subsections to combine
multiple reports assumes that all reports come from correct
nodes. Unfortunately, as we discussed in Sec. 1, faulty or
adversarial users may report fake position information and
invalidate any attempt by the LA to estimate their own
and other vehicles’ positions. Thus, it is therefore essential
to determine the trustworthiness of vehicles in order to
tell apart faulty or adversarial nodes. A-VIP performs this
task by leveraging the information contained in reports sent
by vehicles. Hence, the trust attribution process described
below is only performed, within each time step, for the
subset V ⊆ V of vehicles that satisfy two conditions: (i)
having transmitted a beacon and (ii) having had such beacon
reported by others.
The trustworthiness probability of vehicle vi at a generic
time step, which we will refer to as γi ∈ [0, 1], is determined
by the LA through a three-phase process:
(1) the location probability Φ(Ri)i,s that vi is at any tile
s ∈ S upon beacon transmission is computed by taking into
account the (unknown) trustworthiness of vehicles in Ri,
i.e., those that reported the beacon sent by vi;
(2) the location and trustworthiness probabilities of all ve-
hicles in V are combined into a global consistency function,
χ, corresponding to the average number of vehicles that are
correctly estimated to be in their declared location;
(3) the trustworthiness probability γi of each vehicle in V
is computed so that the consistency function χ is maximized.
Phase one above is achieved by letting the LA combine the
information it received in the reports in a similar fashion as
that of (2). This time, however, the unknowns represented
by the trustworthiness of the vehicles participating in the
process are integrated in the expression. Specifically, for
each s ∈ S, the LA evaluates the location probability Φ(Ri)i,s
that vi was in tile s when sending the beacon, as:
Φ(Ri)i,s =
∑
Z∈℘(Ri)
⎛
⎝P (Z)i,s ∏
j:vj∈Z
γj
∏
k:vk∈Ri\Z
(1 − γk)
⎞
⎠ . (4)
In (4), ℘(Ri) is the power set of Ri, i.e., all possible
subsets (proper and not) of reporters in Ri. The terms P
(Z)
i,s
are calculated as in (2), using the probabilities p(j)i,s . Recall
6that the latter probabilities are computed using either (3)
or (1), depending on whether the information on the Q-
value is available or not. Also, we define P (∅)i,s = P(B
(i)
s ).
In words, the expression in (4) states that, if only the
reporters in the subset Z are trustworthy, which happens
with probability
∏
j:vj∈Z
γj ·
∏
k:vk∈Ri\Z
(1− γk), then the
probability that the beaconer vi was in s is obtained by
considering the reports sent by such vehicles (vj ∈ Z) and
neglecting the others (vk ∈ Ri\Z). Consistently, the term
P (∅)i,s corresponds to the case where no trustworthy vehicle
exists, hence the probability that vi was in s is P(B
(i)
s ),
which does not depend on any report. Finally, note that, if
γj = 1 ∀j : vj ∈ Ri, the expression in (4) reduces to P
(Ri)
i,s ,
i.e., to the probability associated to the intersection of all the
reported beacon receptions, as illustrated in Sec. 4.1.
In the second phase, the LA defines the global consistency
function, χ, as the (expected) number of correctly estimated
positions for vehicles in V:
χ =
∑
i:vi∈V
(
γiΦ
(Ri)
i,li
+ (1 − γi)
∑
s∈S
Φ(Ri)i,s
)
. (5)
For each vehicle vi, the first term of the sum in (5)
corresponds to the case where vi is correct (which happens
with probability γi), and it represents the probability that vi
was in the tile including the position li that it announced in
its beacon. The second term, instead, corresponds to the case
where vi cannot be trusted (which happens with probability
1 − γi) and it accounts for the probability that vi could
have been in any of the possible tiles, s ∈ S. Note that
the expression in (5) has the following interesting property:
when all vehicles are trustworthy, i.e., γi = 1 ∀i, it reduces
to χ =
∑
i:vi∈V
P (Ri)i,li ≤ |V|. In this case, χ is a measure
of the accuracy of the estimation based on the cooperative
position identification described in Sec. 4.1, which correctly
increases as χ approaches |V|.
In phase three, the LA determines the trustworthiness γi
of each vehicle in V by solving following problem:
max
∑
i:vi∈V
(
γiΦ
(Ri)
i,li
+ δi
∑
s∈S Φ
(Ri)
i,s
)
s.t. Φ(Ri)i,s =
∑
Z∈℘(Ri)
(
P (Z)i,s
∏
j:vj∈Z
γj
∏
k:vk∈Ri\Z
δi
)
0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1 γi + δi = 1 .
In the problem above, the objective imposes to maximize
the consistency χ. The first constraint enforces the definition
of Φ, and is equivalent to (4). The second constraint ensures
that γ values are between 0 and 1. The last two constraints
introduce a set of auxiliary variables δi = 1 − γi. By
introducing these variables in the problem, we make the ob-
jective posynomial2. Posynomial problems can be reduced to
a convex form and thus maximized in polynomial time [23].
2. A posynomial is a function of the form f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =∑K
k=1 ckx
a1k
1
· · ·x
ank
n where all xi and coefficients ck are positive real
numbers, and the exponents aik are real.
Algorithm 1 Identifying the set of trustworthy vehicles.
Require: γi, ∀vi ∈ V
1: T ← ∅
2: T ′ ← ∅
3: repeat
4: T ← T ′
5: vi ← argmaxh:vh∈V\T γh
6: T ′ ← T ∪ {vi}
7: until
(
∃vk: vi ∈ Rk ∧maxS P
(T ′k)
k,s = 0
)
∨ T ′ = V
8: return T
4.3 Detecting fake identities
The above mechanism is based on the consistency among
the reported positions of all vehicles. However, it may not
be sufficient against Sybil attackers, which control multiple
identities and use them to consistently report false positions.
To this end, we put in place a specific mechanism to uncover
fake identities, named buddy detection.
The key idea is fairly simple: if two (or more) vehicles
consistently appear to be colocated, there is something sus-
picious. More formally, we say that two vehicles vi and vj
consistently appear to be together if the sets Rki and R
k
j
overlap for more than a fraction f , i.e., if
∑
k
|Rki ∩R
k
j | ≥ f ·min
(∑
k
|Rki |,
∑
k
|Rkj |
)
. (6)
If the above condition is verified, we set γi = γj = 0, i.e.,
the LA declares both vi and vj as non-trustworthy. Note
that the minimum in (6) implies that an attacker alternating
several fake identities will still be detected.
The parameter f should be set taking into account two
factors. First, some beacons and reports may be lost, and
the overlap between the sets may be not complete. Second,
an attacker controlling more than f · |Ri| fake identities
will not be detected. In Sec. 6.3, we show the effective-
ness of the buddy detection mechanism in terms of false
positives/negatives, already for low values of f .
4.4 Deriving the vehicle positions
As a result of the above procedure, the LA obtains the γi
values for all vehicles in V , i.e., those that, during the time
step under consideration, have broadcast a beacon that was
then reported to the LA. Then, the LA can run Alg. 1 with
the goal to determine the set T ⊆ V of vehicles deemed to
be trustworthy.
At the outset, the LA initializes the set of trustworthy
vehicles, T , to the empty set (line 1). Then, at each step,
it selects the vehicle vi in V, but not in T yet, for which
the probability to be trustworthy is the highest. It adds the
vehicle to the set T ′, which is thus given by T ∪ {vi}
(lines 5–6). If the information provided by vi is consistent
with the one provided by vehicles already in T , then vi is
deemed trustworthy as well and included in T .
7More precisely, let us denote by T ′k the set of vehicles that
have reported the beacon sent by vk and are in set T ′. Then,
for each vehicle vk, for which vi has reported a consistent
information with respect to all other trustworthy reporters,
there will be at least one tile s with non-zero probability,
P
(T ′k)
k,s , associated to it (line 7). That is, the intersection
among the location sets corresponding to the reports sent by
the trustworthy vehicles and by vi will not be empty. If this is
the case, vi is added to T (line 4). Otherwise, vi, and all the
reporters with a value of trustworthiness probability lower
than γi, are tagged as non-trustworthy, and the procedure
ends. Thus, the last computed set T includes all vehicles in
V that are deemed to be trustworthy by the LA.
After running Alg. 1, for each vehicle vi in V , the LA
determines the position set Li ⊆ S corresponding to the
locations where the vehicle is deemed to be. In particular,
if vi ∈ T , the LA considers the position Li = {li}, where
li is the location declared by vi in its beacon. Otherwise,
the LA associates to vi the set of possible locations Li =
{s|P (Ti)i,s > 0}. Note that, if vi ̸∈ T and no trustworthy
vehicle has reported the beacon from vi, i.e., Ti = ∅, we
have P (∅)i,s = 0 ∀s ∈ S, hence Li = ∅ and no position
estimation is available at this time instant for vi.
As a last step, the LA checks for all vehicles in V , for
which Li ̸= ∅, if their location was missing at some of
the previous time instants. Let us consider the case where
the LA finds missing position information for vi at all time
instants k ∈ (n, n+T ), while Lni and L
n+T
i are not empty.
Then, the LA can estimate Lki as follows. For each pair of
tiles s ∈ Lni and u ∈ L
n+T
i , the LA exploits the empirical
probability density function of the traveling time from s to
u and verifies whether the probability that vi was in the
generic tile t ∈ S at time k is greater than 0. If so, t is
added to the set Lki . By doing so, the LA obtains a set of
possible positions for vi at k, along with their probabilities.
5 ATTACKS AGAINST A-VIP
Next, we discuss some possible attacks targeted at disrupting
the position verification process described above. Our focus
is on attacks orchestrated by single or multiple, albeit in-
dependent, adversaries. Colluding adversaries would indeed
have the additional burden of continuous platooning to be
successful, thus we consider these attacks as unpractical.
Transmit-power attack. The A-VIP position identification
technique described in Sec. 4.1 relies on the fact that all
correct vehicles transmit their beacons at the same power
level. An attacker may maliciously increase or decrease its
transmit power, thus affecting the Q-unaware and Q-aware
approaches to the position verification and pretending to
be closer or farther from the reporters than it actually is.
However, while fooling a part of its neighbors, the attacker
cannot help but appear inconsistent to the rest, since its
announced position does not match the expected physical
behavior of the transmission. Thus, A-VIP successfully
detects transmit-power attacks, as shown in Sec. 6.3.
False location attack. It aims at pretending to be at a
location different from the actual one, and at the same time
at disrupting the operation of the beacon-reporting process.
Specifically, the attack consists in a vehicle transmitting a
beacon that includes the right time-dependent secret but
a false position information. The announced position will
not be coherent with the locations advertised by vehicles
receiving the beacon in their reports, which may generate
problems in the verification process. However, our results in
Sec. 6.3 demonstrate that the A-VIP verification mechanism
described in Sec. 4.2 is robust to this kind of attack.
Replay attack. Adversarial users replay beacons from cor-
rect vehicles. Although the attacker can retransmit a copy of
the beacon, it cannot tamper with its content, as both the se-
cret ni and the beaconer position information are encrypted.
We remark that encrypting the location lni together with the
current counter value, as described in Sec. 3.2, univocally
ties lni to
n
i . This prevents partial replay attacks, where the
adversary only replays ni and modifies the encrypted field
n
i that contains the position information .
Still, by performing a full replay at locations other than
those of the original broadcast, the attacker could induce the
LA to tag correct nodes as faulty. In such cases, the timing
of the replay is of the essence:
• in case of a replay attack occurring more than τb
seconds after the legitimate beacon was broadcast, the
LA will no longer be able to match the secret in the
beacon with any precomputed secret during that time
frame, and the report table entry will be ignored;
• in case of a replay attack occurring less than τb seconds
after the legitimate beacon was broadcast, the replayed
message will be reported multiple times by one or more
witnesses. The LA will easily detect the presence of a
duplicate, delayed entry in reports and reject it.
In the latter case, the trustworthiness of the original
beacon sender would be tarnished. However, this sender can
detect the replay of its own beacon and report the misdeed
by setting the zn−1i bit in its following beacon, as introduced
in Sec. 3.2. Recall that zn−1i can only be set by the original
beacon sender, since it is encrypted along with the vehicle
position within ni and its freshness is ensured by the counter
value. The LA will thus know that the beacon is invalid
without affecting the vehicle credibility. The only result
an attacker can achieve is thus to occasionally invalidate
beacons from random vehicles. Jamming could yield the
same effect with lower system complexity.
Wormhole attack. The replay attack can be combined with
a wormhole attack, so that a full replay occurs less than τb
seconds after the legitimate beacon was broadcast and in a
different region (to avoid detection by the original sender).
As a result, the replayed beacon will also be reported by wit-
nesses other than those within the sender’s communication
range. In this case, the LA can detect the inconsistency by
noting that the same beacon is heard by multiple witnesses
farther apart than the nominal transmission range. The LA
will thus be able to disregard both the original and replayed
beacon entries without affecting the trustworthiness of the
8original sender. Additionally, the information collected at the
LA allows for locating the wormhole ends, which have to
be placed within the communication range of the reporters
receiving the duplicate beacon. Since A-VIP implicitly coun-
teracts wormhole attacks, we do not experimentally assess
its robustness to them.
Phantom attack. An adversarial vehicle can run a phantom
attack by never broadcasting beacons, nor reporting to the
LA: such a vehicle would thus be completely transparent
to the system. Its advantages are dubious. If, on the one
hand, the attack could be used by a vehicle who is trying
to escape liability after causing a car wreck, on the other,
a phantom attacker falsely accused of being involved in an
accident would be unable to prove it was elsewhere.
Additionally, phantom attacks could pose a threat to
commercial applications such as e-toll enforcement. In such
cases, the onboard devices are required to be tamper-resistant
HSMs integrating the antenna apparatus, so that no vehicle
can successfully disappear from the network. For these
reasons, countering this attack is out of the scope of A-VIP.
Teleport attack. An adversarial user could impair local
transmissions of its own beacons and have a colluder broad-
cast those same beacons at a location other than that where
it actually is. We refer to this as teleport attack, enabling
the adversary to, e.g., deny liability in any accident in
which she is involved by having her beacons broadcasted
at a distant, safe location. The same discussion as for the
phantom attack applies here as well, and an integrated-
antenna HSM is required to prevent teleport attacks when
the goal is determining liability. Thus, we do not assess the
robustness of A-VIP to such attack.
Sybil attack. In a vehicular network, a Sybil attack is run
by a single car that owns multiple identities and can thus
impersonate several vehicles [24]. In the context of localiza-
tion, a Sybil attacker can autonomously corroborate the fake
position it advertises. More specifically, an adversarial user
could avoid broadcasting beacons (i.e., perform a phantom
attack), yet have multiple impersonated vehicles reciprocally
(though falsely) report each other’s beacons. Such attackers
could thus claim any possible position.
We stress that Sybil attacks are difficult by nature. In
a system of communicating vehicles, identities cannot be
fabricated but they must have been legitimately obtained,
hence successively stolen by the adversary. Such a hurdle
makes the Sybil attack often infeasible, or only feasible for
a short time before the identity theft is discovered.
Nonetheless, A-VIP is designed to cope this attack. The
buddy detection procedure described in Sec. 4.3 aims pre-
cisely at discovering fake identities. We prove its effective-
ness in Sec. 6.3.
6 EVALUATION
Our evaluation of A-VIP is carried out in a simulated, yet
realistic, vehicular scenario, as well as in real-world live
testbeds. They are presented in Sec 6.1, along with the metric
adopted to assess the quality of the A-VIP results, and in
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the Supplemental Material. Our simulative and experimental
study has two main goals. Firstly, in Sec. 6.2 we aim at
acquiring a better understanding of the accuracy of the
position estimation provided by our framework. Secondly,
in Sec. 6.3, we focus on testing the A-VIP resilience to a
range of different attacks.
6.1 Scenarios and metrics
Simulation scenario. Simulations are run on a map repre-
senting a 1×1.5 km2 section of the urban area of Ingolstadt,
Germany. The scenario models a total of 2792 vehicles
over a period of about 1 hour, with a mean trip time of
5 minutes and 24 seconds and a mean road traffic density of
300 vehicles per km2 [19]. The vehicular mobility is gen-
erated using the well-known Simulator of Urban MObility
(SUMO), capable of reproducing real-world microscopic and
macroscopic road traffic. The RF signal propagation is mod-
eled through the 802.11p/DSRC radio shadowing technique
proposed in [22]. The model accounts for buildings, and
has been validated via real-world measurements in urban
environments. As a result of the coupling of the vehicular
mobility and signal propagation, we record vehicles to have
an average of 69.83 neighbors, i.e., potential reporters per
beacon in A-VIP. The availability of RF signal propagation
information in the evaluation scenario lets us leverage the
Q-aware technique presented in Sec. 4.1 to compute the
probabilities p(j)i,s . We also model the 802.11p channel access
and collisions that may take place among simultaneous
transmissions.
While assessing the impact of malicious behavior, we con-
sider a challenging scenario where 10% of the vehicles are
randomly selected as adversaries, unless otherwise specified.
9Experimental testbed. We implemented the A-VIP protocol
on commercial off-the-shelf hardware, in order to assess its
position estimation capabilities and robustness to attacks in
live testbeds. One of the testbeds is deployed in a urban
area in the center of Turin, Italy, and is described, along
with performance results, in the Supplemental Material.
The testbed we present here covers instead a 2-km road
loop nearby Turin, Italy, and is composed of portions of
a public road and of a private road in a suburban woodland
area. The testbed comprises 5 vehicles, which follow the
route portrayed in the left image of Fig. 4. A single RSU
is deployed in the testbed, providing intermittent Internet
access to up to five vehicles circulating at a time in the road
loop within each other’s range for most of the time.
From a technical viewpoint, the RSU and the vehicles are
equipped with an Alix PC Engines motherboard, with an
AMD Geode 500 MHz processor and one Ubiquiti Networks
XtremeRange 5 radio IEEE 802.11a card. Vehicles carry
one 5-dBi omnidirectional antenna on their rooftops, and
are configured to transmit at an output power of 18 dBm.
Finally, GPS receivers provide vehicle localization data.
A-VIP is implemented as a user-level application capable
of transmitting and receiving beacons in ad hoc mode
between vehicles, and sending reports to the RSU. Beacons
are generated and broadcast every τb seconds, which is a
configurable system parameter. The beaconing application
exploits native IEEE 802.11 beacons, by including the
information required for A-VIP operation, i.e., the secret ni
and the encrypted location information ni of the emitting
vehicle vi. Such data is 32-byte long and is injected in the
Vendor Specific Information Element (Vendor IE) field of
the 802.11 beacon, as depicted in Fig. 5, without any need
to edit the wireless card drivers. Upon reception of a new
beacon from vi, a vehicle vj retrieves and stores the A-VIP
data in its report table, along with a 4-byte reception time
tji, a 8-byte current position lji and a 1-byte received signal
quality indicator Qnji.
In our live testbed, the propagation model used for the Q-
aware computation of the probabilities p(j)i,s is derived from
experimental measurements. The corresponding propagation
map is depicted in the three right plots of Fig. 4, where, for
clarity of presentation, the values of received signal power
have been discretized into high (-40 to -60 dBm), medium (-
60 to -80 dBm) and low (-80 to -95 dBm) signal quality bins.
Consistently with intuition, we remark that shorter distances
correspond to better signal quality.
In the case of attacks, we use 5 vehicles and randomly
select 2 of them as adversaries.
Location error. In order to express the quality of the
LA estimates, we introduce a metric called location error.
Formally, for the n-th beacon issued by a vehicle vi whose
actual position at the broadcast time is ℓni , the location error
is defined as follows:
eni =
∑
s∈Lni
P (Ti)i,s d(ℓ
n
i , s) . (7)
Note that, in case of a vehicle vi deemed trustworthy (i.e.,
vi ∈ T ), Lni = {l
n
i }, hence the location error represents the
distance between its actual (ℓni ) and declared (l
n
i ) positions.
Thus, in this case eni = 0 if the vehicle is actually correct
and its GPS is precise.
Instead, if vi is not deemed trustworthy, the location error
is the average of the distances between its actual location
and the centers of the tiles representing its possible locations.
The average is weighted by the probability that vi is in each
of such tiles s ∈ Lni , according to trustworthy vehicles that
received the n-th beacon from vi (i.e., P
(Ti)
i,s ). In this case,
eni is the error that the LA incurs when trying to recover the
actual position of an untrusted vehicle from the reports of
trustworthy cars.
We stress that the second situation occurs also in the case
of a vehicle vi announcing its position with a frequency
lower than that used by the LA to verify locations. Indeed,
this forces the LA to estimate the location of vi, as described
in Sec. 4.4. In the following, we set the reporting periodicity
τr equal to the beaconing interval τb, and consider that the
LA verifies the position of all vehicles at every second, thus
computing the location errors with a 1-Hz frequency.
6.2 A-VIP position estimation quality
We first assess the quality of the position estimation de-
scribed in Sec. 4.1, both via simulation and our suburban live
testbed, in absence of faulty or adversarial users. In this case,
the uncertainty comes from the RF signal propagation, which
is time-varying and may induce errors in the estimation
process, possibly up to the point where some vehicles are
tagged as untrustworthy. Additionally, beacons and reports
may be lost due to channel errors, contributing to impair the
verification by the LA.
Simulation results. Fig. 6 shows how the location error,
averaged over all vehicles, is affected by different system
parameters in the simulation scenario.
In Fig. 6(a), we assume that all vehicles periodically
report to the LA according to the procedure described in
Sec. 3.2, and we evaluate the impact of the per-vehicle
beacon transmission periodicity τb. Colors denote different
spatial granularities (i.e., tile side lengths), ranging from 10
to 50 m. In these tests, A-VIP correctly tags all vehicles in
the simulation as trustworthy, thus the framework does not
generate any false positive. According to the location error
definition in (7), the positions considered by the LA are those
declared by the vehicles in their reports (solid lines in the
plot). However, for the sake of completeness, we also report
the error measured on positions estimated from other cars’
reports through the Q-aware approach presented in Sec. 4.1
(dashed lines). This allows us to comment on the quality of
the cooperative position identification.
We can first observe that τb has a dramatic impact on the
location error, under all configurations. As the LA computes
the location error every second, τb values larger than one
second result in missing position information and trigger
the estimation process of missing intermediate locations
presented in Sec. 4.4. Clearly, the longer the τb, the more
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Fig. 6. Simulation: location error vs. (a) the beaconing interval τb, (b) the fraction of reporting vehicles, and (c) the
number of reporters per beacon when τb = 10 s. Grey/red/black colors identify different tile sizes in (a) and reporter
positions in (c); solid/dashed lines refer to declared/estimated locations in (a) and to average/90th percentile in (c).
distant the position samples, leading to a less accurate
estimation of intermediate locations. When this effect is
marginal (τb is between 1 and 3 seconds), the error ranges
in the order of the tile size.
When comparing the errors yielded by declared and esti-
mated positions, they only differ when the absolute error is
small, and, even then, the distance between the two is always
in the order of the tile size. This allows us to conclude that
reports are an efficient source of information to estimate the
actual location of vehicles, and that we can trust the Q-aware
cooperative position identification in case no positioning
information is explicitly provided by a vehicle.
Fig. 6(b) shows the impact of the fraction of vehicles
participating in the A-VIP reporting, when the tile size is set
to 10 m. When all vehicles upload report messages, i.e., the
fraction is equal to 1, the error corresponds to that measured
in Fig. 6(a). However, as participation in reporting dwindles,
i.e., for lower values on the x axis, the error tends to grow,
slowly at first and faster later on. This effect, consistent
through all values of τb, is due to the fact that, in presence
of smaller sets of reporting vehicles, beacons are less likely
to be received by any reporter. Non-reported beacons will
never reach the LA. The latter will treat these situations
as missing position information cases, thus estimating the
location of vehicles whose beacons have not been reported
as from Sec. 4.4. As discussed before, the estimate accuracy
decreases as more beacons remain unreported. However, A-
VIP appears robust to the lack of reporting, as errors become
significant only if the majority of vehicles do not upload
reports.
Fig. 6(c) shows a breakdown of the location error depend-
ing on the number and position of the reporters, for a tile
size of 10 m and τb = 10 s. The overall average error (solid
grey line) is not affected by the number of vehicles reporting
the beacon, while the 90th percentile (dashed grey line) is.
This implies that a low number of reporters can generate
a few large error situations, namely, when beaconers fall
outside the polygon whose vertices are the reporting vehicles
(black solid and dashed lines). Conversely, if the beaconer is
within such a polygon (red solid and dashed lines), the error
remains low even for a small number of reporters. Indeed, in
the latter case and when the reporters vj ∈ Ri of a beacon
from vi are farther apart, the intersection of the sets S
(j)
i
is smaller, as shown in Fig. 2, and the location estimate is
much more accurate. We can conclude that large position
estimation errors only concern vehicles whose beacons are
reported by a few neighbors clustered on one side of the
beaconer.
Testbed. A direct comparison of testbed and simulation
results is not viable due to the very different settings that
characterize the two environments, including the covered
area, the number of cars and the propagation conditions.
However, the qualitative behavior of the location error versus
the beaconing interval τb observed in the experimental eval-
uation, in Fig. 7(a), matches the simulated one in Fig. 6(a).
Also in the testbed case, longer time intervals between
back-to-back beacon transmissions determine higher location
errors. The reason lies again in the difficulty of inferring
intermediate locations between distant position samples.
We consider the match above as a positive result implying
that real-world RF signal propagation, despite its complex
and time-varying nature, does not induce dramatic errors
in the A-VIP position estimation process. Similarly, real-
world beacon and report message losses, measured to affect
around 1% of messages in our experiments, do not impair
the verification process at the LA. As a consequence, the
experimental curves confirm that location errors in the order
of the tile size (set to 10 m in these tests) are achievable in
real settings if τb = 1 s.
Interestingly, the testbed results obtained with a varying
number of vehicles (ranging from 1 to 5 and mapping onto
different lines in Fig. 7(a)) also validate the finding that the
error is significantly reduced when the number of vehicles
(hence reporters) increases up to 5.
Finally, the testbed also gave us the possibility to assess
the impact that the vehicle speed and geographical position
have on the Q-aware estimation accuracy. Fig. 7(b) presents
the relationship between the error on the estimated locations
and the vehicle speed averaged over 30 s-intervals, when
5 vehicles are used and τb = 1 s. The vehicle speed is
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Fig. 7. Testbed: location error vs. (a) the beaconing interval, (b) the vehicle speed, and (c) the vehicle geographical
position. The latter two plots show the error on the Q-aware estimation when τb = 1 s and τb = 10 s, respectively.
averaged so as to remove outliers due to GPS errors, hence
make the plot more readable. The results show a strong
correlation between the error on the estimated locations and
the traveling speed, explained by the fact that higher speeds
introduce a higher variability in vehicle positions and make
the estimation less accurate. The geographical analysis of the
error, depicted in Fig. 7(c) for τb = 10 s, is consistent with
such a conclusion. Indeed, high errors (i.e., dark regions in
the plot) are recorded on straight segments of the road when
the speed is higher, while the lowest errors (i.e., light dots
in the plot) are observed at slow-speed turns. Overall, we
conclude that the Q-aware position estimation run by A-VIP
yields good performance as confirmed by both simulation
and real-world experiments.
6.3 Robustness to attacks
Having assessed A-VIP position estimation reliability in
presence of correct nodes only, we now evaluate the ro-
bustness of our solution (described in Secs. 4.2–4.4) to
attacks led by adversarial nodes. We consider attacks for
which tamper-proof HSM is not needed. Consistently with
the findings in Sec. 6.2 and if not stated otherwise, we
will assume τb = 1 s, a tile side of 10m, and all vehicles
participating in the reporting process.
Transmit-power attack. We consider the case of transmit-
power attacks, described in Sec. 5, and assess the A-VIP ro-
bustness via simulation. Fig. 8(a) shows the Cumulative Dis-
tribution Function (CDF) of the trustworthiness γ assigned
by A-VIP to correct (solid line) and adversarial (dashed line)
vehicles. Different colors map onto beaconing intervals τb
of 1 and 10 seconds, respectively. The distributions clearly
show how A-VIP can tell apart correct and misbehaving
nodes, assigning high γ values (typically close to one) to
the former, and much lower γ values (often near zero) to
the latter. Notably, the percentage of adversarial nodes with
high trustworthiness is small, a good performance in light
of the large percentage of attackers (10% as mentioned
in Sec. 6.1) and the fact that they are allowed significant
freedom, being able to increase their transmit power by up
to 20 dB (100 mW).
The value of γ allows the LA to decide which vehicles
can be trusted and which cannot, as detailed in Sec. 4.4. The
impact of such a classification on the accuracy of positions
validated by the LA is portrayed in Fig. 8(b), in terms of
the resulting location error. We can observe that correct
vehicles are effectively identified by A-VIP: their errors with
(solid red line, “A-VIP correct”) or without (solid black line,
“No attack”) adversaries mostly overlap, and they do not
suffer from the presence of transmit-power attackers. On the
contrary, attackers are tracked down by A-VIP: their actual
locations are estimated by the LA (dashed red line, “A-VIP
adversary”) with fair accuracy.
We attempted running transmit-power attacks in the ex-
perimental testbeds as well. However, the wireless interface
cards we employed only allow for very limited transmission
power variations, of 5 dB at most. As shown in Fig. 8(c),
such a small power offset is lost in the Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) variability due to normal RF
signal propagation phenomena. Therefore, the interface card
limitations did not allow us to implement adversarial nodes
that were substantially different from correct vehicles in
terms of transmitted power.
False location attack. As described in Sec. 5, false location
attacks are performed in our evaluation by announcing out-
dated positions along with consistent cryptographic material.
We first study their effect in simulation, assuming that
adversaries run false location attacks by including in their
beacons the position they were at 10 s before.
Fig. 9(a) portrays the CDF of the trustworthiness probabil-
ity γ for correct and adversarial vehicles, when τb is set to 1 s
and 10 s. Also in this case, A-VIP reliably separates the two
classes of nodes, assigning high γ values to the former and
low γ values to the latter. Only 5% to 10% of the attackers
are assigned a high trustworthiness, and this mainly occurs
for adversarial nodes that did not move significantly during
the 10-second delay of the attack. The proper classification
of correct and adversarial behaviors leads to extremely low
false positives (i.e., attackers tagged as trustworthy) and false
negatives (i.e., correct nodes tagged as adversarial). Fig. 9(b)
depicts false positives and false negatives as the fraction
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vs. beaconing interval τb, for a 10% of adversaries. In (a) and (c), solid/dashed curves indicate correct/adversary
nodes. In (a) black/red colors identify different τb, while in (c) black/red/grey colors identify the “All trusted”, “A-VIP”
and “No attack” cases. In (c), in the “No attack” case, all vehicles are correct, thus only the “Correct” curve appears.
of adversaries varies between 2% and 10%. The results are
obtained for τb = 10 s and shows that both types of incorrect
tagging are limited to less than 2% of vehicles in all cases.
Similarly, the good classification performance of A-VIP
leads to limited location errors, in Fig. 9(c). Once more,
longer beaconing intervals result in higher location errors,
for all cases. However, differences emerge when we focus
on different curves. When all nodes are correct and we do
not have any attack (solid grey line, “No attack”), we have
the standard position estimation error already discussed in
Sec. 6.2. By introducing a 10% of attackers (red lines), we
observe that the location error of correct nodes (solid red
line, “A-VIP correct”) – properly identified by A-VIP as
previously shown – does not change significantly. Positions
announced by adversarial nodes are discarded: their actual
locations, estimated through the cooperative Q-aware tech-
nique (dashed red line, “A-VIP adversary”), show again a
fair accuracy. For completeness, the plot also shows the error
values in the case where all nodes are trusted (black lines).
We note that correct nodes (solid black line, “All trusted
correct”) exhibit the minimum error, since the position they
advertise is trusted by the LA and matches their actual
location. However, the LA believes also adversarial vehicles
(dashed black line, “All trusted adversary”), which leads to
a very high error in their position.
Fig. 10 shows the resilience of A-VIP to delay attacks
through the measured location error for τb = 1 s and a
delay of 10 s or 30 s. Each pair of bars refers to one of
the cases plotted in Fig. 9(c) and, for sake of readability,
the numerical value of the error (expressed in meters) is
reported on top of each bar. We note that a delay of 10 s
allows attackers to correctly announce positions that are up
to 60 m away if the trustworthiness mechanism of A-VIP is
not used (2nd grey bar from the left, “All trusted adversary”).
When such a mechanism is employed, the error (4th grey
bar from the left, “A-VIP adversary”) becomes negligible,
meaning that adversaries are correctly identified and their
actual locations are estimated within the accuracy limits of
the Q-aware technique.
Increasing the attack delay to 30 s leave more room for
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misbehavior. We observe that without verification, adver-
sarial vehicles can announce positions almost 150 m away
from their actual location (2nd black bar from the left, “All
trusted adversary”). Instead, the trustworthiness mechanism
of A-VIP still allows us to reliably tell apart incorrect nodes.
Their true position is estimated with an error in the order of
meters (4th black bar from the left, “A-VIP adversary”) with
respect to the case where attackers are absent (5th black bar
from the left, “No attack”).
Sybil attack. The last type of threat considered in our
performance evaluation is the one brought about by the Sybil
attack, detailed in Sec. 5. The limited number of vehicles
available in our testbed does not allow us to experimentally
evaluate A-VIP resilience to Sybil attacks. Therefore, in
the following we resort to simulation. More precisely, we
consider that 2% to 10% of the vehicles run Sybil attacks,
and set the f parameter of the A-VIP buddy detection
mechanism presented in Sec. 4.3 to 0.05. As shown by the
results below, this low fraction is already sufficient to detect
Sybil attacks in most cases.
We first consider the case where adversarial nodes own
cryptographic material granting them one additional identity.
Indeed, this is barely sufficient for attackers to pass A-
VIP verification even when no buddy detection is used. As
shown in Fig. 11(a), false positives and negatives remain
below 7% in all cases (dashed lines), as self-reporting
via one additional identity is not sufficient to overcome
the honest reporting by correct nodes. At any rate, the
buddy detection mechanism (solid lines) greatly impairs the
success probability of Sybil attacks as well as the chances
of misclassifying correct vehicles. Fig. 11(b) shows that
adversaries can modify their location by several hundred
meters, when no verification is run (dashed black line) as
well as when no buddy detection is used (dashed red line).
By employing A-VIP with buddy detection, no maneuvering
room is left to Sybil attackers: they are identified and their
actual location is accurately estimated (dashed grey line).
Adversaries capable of impersonating three vehicles in
addition to their actual identity make a great case for a
solution such as A-VIP. Fig. 11(c) proves that three illicitly
owned identities are sufficient to grant a Sybil attacker
significant probability of success. Specifically, more than
20% of the attacks (dashed red line) are successful if no
buddy detection is employed. As a side effect, up to 14%
of correct vehicles (dashed black line) are at risk of being
tagged as untrustworthy. The adoption of the buddy detection
mechanism however limits both false negatives and positives
to values below 2% in the worst case (solid lines).
The positive impact of the buddy detection naturally trans-
lates into much lower location errors, shown in Fig. 11(d).
With three additional identities, Sybil attackers can modify
their location by more than 600 m without being detected
by the LA, if no A-VIP trustworthiness mechanism (dashed
black line) or buddy detection (dashed red line) are em-
ployed. Conversely, A-VIP with buddy detection bounds the
error to nearly zero values.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented A-VIP, a lightweight privacy-preserving
framework for verification and inference of vehicle positions
by a Location Authority. A-VIP leverages computationally-
inexpensive symmetric cryptography and reciprocal report-
ing of anonymized beacons by vehicles. Simulation and ex-
periments in real-world testbeds have shown A-VIP capable
of achieving its goals in both dense and sparse vehicular
settings. Our results also show that A-VIP can effectively
cope with several feasible attacks on a position verification
system, with a small percentage of false positive/negatives.
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